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Mandatory ADR Notice Requirements:
Gender Themes and Intentionality
in Policy Discourse
Becky L. Jacobs*
A number of regulatory bodies impose a mandatory duty on
lawyers to notify their clients of alternative forms of dispute resolution in connection with any engagement involving a conflict,
potential lawsuit, or lawsuit. The propriety of such a requirement is subject to an on-going, and increasingly predictable, debate focused upon the scope of the duty and any exemptions
therefrom and upon its intrusiveness vis-à-vis lawyer autonomy.
This article reviews the relevant ethical rules and the debate inspired thereby; considers the gender-related themes present and,
more importantly, absent in this debate; and raises questions
about the possible pragmatic and policy-related impacts and relevance of these themes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Alternative dispute resolution, or “appropriate” dispute resolution as many refer to it (“ADR”), has become an essential and permanent part of the legal architecture.1 Advocates maintain that the
processing and resolution of disputes can be improved quantitatively,
qualitatively, more democratically,2 and with less of an emotional toll
on everyone involved, with mediation, arbitration, and other forms of
ADR. Law students, lawyers, and non-lawyers all are training to become neutrals, and to act as advocates, in ADR proceedings.3
A number of regulatory bodies impose a duty on lawyers to notify
their clients of alternative forms of dispute resolution in connection
with any engagement involving a conflict, potential lawsuit, or lawsuit. The propriety of such a requirement is subject to an on-going,
and increasingly predictable, debate focused upon the scope of the
duty and any exemptions therefrom and upon its intrusiveness vis-àvis lawyer autonomy.
Absent from this debate is any consideration of the claims that
have been made regarding the impact that this duty might have on
women or other often subordinated parties. The controversy regarding this ethical obligation, mandatory or hortatory, at a minimum,
fails to address, and, at worst, ignores, the critiques that have been
expressed about the potential dangers that informal ADR processes
may pose for women, racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, and
others with “power imbalances” in particular disputes as well as in
society generally.4

mediation process in particular to bring forth, in the most startling ways and at the
most unexpected times, that last remaining reserve of hope, trust, affection, or
optimism to inspire parties to resolve their conflicts.
1. See Suzanne J. Schmitz, Giving Meaning to the Second Generation of ADR
Education: Attorneys’ Duty to Learn about ADR and What They Must Learn, 1999 J.
DISP. RESOL. 29, 29 (1999). See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO.
L.J. 2663, 2689-90 (1995).
2. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is ODR ADR? Reflections of an ADR
Founder from 15th ODR Conference, LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE (Sept.
22, 2016, 10:20 PM), http://law-tech-a2j.org/odr/is-odr-adr-reflections-of-an-adrfounder-from-15th-odr-conference/.
3. See Kristin L. Fortin, Reviving the Lawyer’s Role as Servant Leader: The Professional Paradigm and a Lawyer’s Ethical Obligation to Inform Clients About Alternative Dispute Resolution, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 617 (2009).
4. See Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR: Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1055, 1058-61 (1996).
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This article reviews the relevant standards and ethical rules and
the debate inspired thereby; considers the gender-related themes present and, more importantly, absent in this debate; and raises questions about the possible pragmatic and policy-related impacts and
relevance of these themes.
II. THE “RULES”

AND

THE “DUTY”

As ADR became a more recognizable landmark on lawyers’ philosophical road maps,5 many commentators began to suggest that the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“ABA Model Rules”)6 address the need for ADR consultations with clients.7 The topic has
been the subject of intense debate since the Ethics 2000 Commission
hearings,8 with some arguing that the existing language in the Rules
creates an implicit obligation9 to advise clients regarding ADR and
others countering that this argument is “far-fetched.”10
Noted scholar Frank E.A. Sander, Jr., is among those who have
argued that sections of the Rules create an implied obligation for lawyers to advise clients on the use of ADR. Professor Sander suggests
that, while not stated explicitly, the Model Rules require an attorney
to advise her or his client of ADR options. Others agree that
“[a]ttorneys may have an ethical obligation to advise clients of ADR
5. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO L. J. 29, 45 (1982) (“The
lawyer’s standard philosophical map is useful primarily where the assumptions upon
which it is based, adversariness and amenability to solution by a general rule imposed
by a third party, are valid . . . . The problem is that many lawyers, because of their
philosophical maps, tend to suppose that these assumptions are germane in nearly
any situation that they confront as lawyers. The map, and the litigation paradigm on
which it is based, has a power all out of proportion to its utility.”).
6. MODEL RULES OF PROF ‘L CONDUCT (Am. Bar Ass’n 2016), https://www.ameri
canbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profession
al_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents.html [hereinafter
ABA Model Rules]. The Model Rules were amended in February 2002, August 2003,
August 2012 and February 2013. These Rules have been adopted in whole or in significant part by forty-two jurisdictions. See Frank E.A. Sander, Should There be a Duty
to Advise of ADR Options? Yes: An Aid to Clients, 76 ABA J. 50, 50 (Nov. 1990) [hereinafter Sander].
7. Gerald F. Phillips, The Obligation of Attorneys to Inform Clients About ADR,
31 W. ST. U. L. REV. 239, 239-41 (2004).
8. Id. at 240-43.
9. Id. at 244.
10. Id. at 244-45 (quoting Benjamin Bycel, in Benjamin Brand, Ethical Obligations to Inform Clients of the ADR Option, in HOW ADR WORKS 17, 19 (Norman Brand
ed., 2002)).
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methods.”11 In a comprehensive and thoughtful paper written for the
ABA Dispute Resolution Section, another analyst argues that “[i]t is
only if one posits that ADR is outside the normal scope of legal practice”12 that one would not consider ADR consultation to be part of an
attorney’s normal consultation duties.
Five specific sections of the Model Rules have been identified as
sources for this implied duty to inform. The first, Rule 1.1, with the
heading “Competence,” states in pertinent part: “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.” Competence arguably
encompasses advice to clients regarding alternatives to litigation.
Model Rule 1.2(a) is the second. Titled, “Scope of Representation
and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer[,]” this Rule
provides that: “A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision concerning
the objectives of representation . . . and shall consult with the client
as to the means by which they are to be pursued.” As one scholar
writes, “under Rule 1.2, clients should have the opportunity to decide
if an ADR method would best serve their needs.”13 Model Rule 1.2
also requires attorneys to give clients adequate information to understand and accept or reject a settlement proposal. Given that ADR
processes are often intrinsic to settlement, attorneys would need to
explain the risks and benefits of ADR in order for clients to fully understand and evaluate settlement options.
The third, Model Rule 1.4(b), requires that a matter be explained
sufficiently to enable a client to make informed decisions regarding
representation. Titled the “Communications” rule, it also is seen as
imposing a duty on lawyers to discuss dispute resolution options with
clients.14 “[I]f a lawyer fails to present an accurate picture of ADR to
clients, he may risk a claim that he has not adequately ‘consulted’
with the client.”15
A duty to inform a client about ADR may also be implicit in the
Model “Advisor” Rule 2.1, which provides that, “[i]n rendering advice,
a lawyer may refer not only to law, but to other considerations such
11. Monica L. Warmbrod, Could an Attorney Face Disciplinary Actions or Even
Legal Malpractice Liability for Failure to Inform Clients of Alternative Dispute Resolution?, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 791, 809 (1996-97).
12. Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney Be Required to Advise a Client of
ADR Options?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 458 (2000).
13. See Warmbrod, supra note 11, at 811.
14. See Breger, supra note 12, at 433-36; see also Warmbrod, supra note 11, at
811-12.
15. Warmbrod, supra note 11, at 811.
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as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant
to the client’s situation.” According to at least one scholar, Rule 2.1
may require lawyers to go beyond advice about legal factors to advise
clients about ADR options consistent with their interests.16
Finally, Model Rule 3.2, indexed under the title “Expediting Litigation,” may also speak to the issue of whether attorneys are required to advise clients about ADR options.17 This Rule requires
lawyers to “make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent
with the interest of the client.”18 As many lawyers believe that ADR
options such as mediation result in earlier settlements and save time
for both clients and attorneys, the efforts of an attorney who fails to
consider alternative processes in a litigated case might be found to be
unreasonable in violation of Rule 3.2.19
Despite these opinions regarding the duty to inform clients about
less formal dispute resolution alternatives pursuant to the ABA
Model Rules, the plain language of the Rules says nothing about
ADR.20 As one critic has so colorfully noted, “[t]he notion that ADR is
implied in the terms of these Rules . . . is no more than wishful thinking on the part of some ADR supporters.”21
Moving beyond the more academic debate, individual jurisdictions have addressed the issue more specifically. The normative trend
is for the “duty to discuss ADR with clients” to appear in a multiplicity of legal vehicles within particular jurisdictions, including state
professional creeds, ethical codes or norms, court rules, or statutes.
These vehicles tend to adopt one of four general approaches vis-à-vis
lawyer conduct: (1) lawyers, or courts, are explicitly mandated to
counsel clients about appropriate ADR processes; (2) lawyers are explicitly encouraged to inform their clients; (3) lawyers are advised
16. Id. at 812.
17. See Breger, supra note 12, at 436.
18. Model Rule 3.2.
19. See, e.g., Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge of Institutionalizing
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil
Litigation in Missouri, 67 MO. L. REV. 473, 515, 525 (2002) (responding to a survey,
attorneys reported a belief that “ADR and mediation can save time and money”). The
Pennsylvania Bar Association has opined that, “[i]f the lawyer fails to convey the mediation proposed to the client, he may not charge the client the expense of trial preparation if these expenses are incurred as a result of the lawyer’s failure to
communicate the offer.” Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 90-125 (1991) (referencing Model Rules 1.2(a), 1.4, and 1.7,
as well as 3.2).
20. See Benjamin J. Bycel, Is There an Ethical Obligation to Inform Clients of
ADR Options?, 27 VT. B.J. 49, 49 (2001).
21. Id. at 49.
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that it might be necessary to discuss ADR; or (4) lawyers must infer
or derive an implied duty regarding client ADR consultations.22 The
following section provides an overview of the scope of any notice obligation in various jurisdictions.
The first approach, an explicit, mandatory duty to counsel clients
about ADR alternatives, provides the most clarity for lawyers. The
following states have such a duty: Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Texas, and Virginia.23
Oregon, California, and Massachusetts also adopt an “explicit,
mandatory duty” approach, but with a twist. For example, an Oregon
statute requires that courts rather than lawyers provide all civil litigants with written information about the mediation process and mediation opportunities in the courts.24 Similarly, courts in California
must make information about the potential advantages and disadvantages of ADR and descriptions of ADR processes available to
plaintiffs in all general civil cases.25 California civil plaintiffs then
must serve a copy of the ADR information on each defendant with the
complaint.26 Several local courts in California also have instituted
standards mandating that attorneys provide their clients with ADR
information at “the earliest available opportunity.”27
22. Ariel M. Kiefer & Stanley A. Leasure, Arkansas Lawyers: An Ethical Obligation to Give ADR Advice?, 50 ARK. L. 32, 32 (2015).
23. See RULES & REGS. OF THE STATE BAR OF GA. R. 3-107, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 7-5 (“A lawyer as adviser has a duty to advise the client as to various forms of
dispute resolution. When a matter is likely to involve litigation, a lawyer has a duty to
inform the client of forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation . . .”). The Massachusetts Supreme Court mandates that attorneys discuss ADR with their clients, while the Massachusetts Rules of Professional
Conduct only suggest that attorneys help clients make informed decisions by discussing trial or negotiation strategy. MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 1:18, DISP. RESOL. R. 5 (2016);
MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:07, MASS. R. PROF. COND. R. 1.4 cmt. 5 (2016). See also MINN.
R. 114.03(b) (2010); MO. S. CT. R. 17.02(b) (“Counsel shall advise their clients of the
availability of alternative dispute resolution programs.”). See also Gerald F. Phillips,
The Obligation of Attorneys to Inform Clients About ADR, 31 W. ST. U. L. REV. 239,
246-47 (2004) (discussing Virginia’s mandatory obligation for a lawyer to advise clients about appropriate ADR by adding comments to Model Rules 1.2, 1.4, and 2.1).
24. See OR. REV. STAT. § 36.185 (1997). There does not appear to be any mention
of ADR in any of the Rules of Professional Conduct in Oregon.
25. CA. ST. CIVIL RULE 3.221(a).
26. CA. ST. CIVIL RULE 3.221(c).
27. Local Rule 2.61 for the Sacramento Super. & Mun. Cts. (2017) (2.61 ADR
Information. Attorneys shall provide their clients with a copy of the Sacramento
County Superior Court ADR information package at the earliest available opportunity and prior to completing the Case Management Conference Statement. The ADR
information package may be obtained from the Mediation Clerk, 720 9th Street, Room
102, Sacramento, CA 95814 or on the Court’s website at http://www.saccourt.ca.gov.
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In Massachusetts, not only are court clerks required to make information about court-connected dispute resolution services available
to attorneys and unrepresented parties, attorneys too must “provide
their clients with this information about court-connected dispute resolution services; discuss with their clients the advantages and disadvantages of the various methods of dispute resolution; and certify
their compliance with this requirement on the civil cover sheet or its
equivalent.”28
Pursuant to the second approach to the ADR notice issue, lawyers in the states of Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii,
Louisiana, and New Jersey are explicitly encouraged, but not mandated, to advise clients about ADR options.29 Hawaii, in particular,
strongly encourages attorneys to address ADR with clients, stating:
“A lawyer should raise and explore the issue of settlement and alternative dispute resolution in every case as soon as the case can be
evaluated and, if feasible, mediation should be encouraged. Specifically, a lawyer who manifests professional courtesy and civility . . .
Plaintiffs and cross complainants shall serve a copy of the Sacramento County Superior Court ADR information package on each defendant or cross-defendant at the time
the complaint or cross-complaint are served as required by California Rules of Court,
rule 3.221.).
28. MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 1:18: DISP. RESOL. R. 5 (2016). The required Counsel
Certification Form is available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/forms/bmc/bmccounsel-certification.pdf.
29. See ALASKA R. OF PROF. COND. R. 2.1, cmt. 5 (“a lawyer should advise the
client of alternative forms of dispute resolution which might reasonably be pursued . . . .) (emphasis added); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-204 (2016) (“An attorney . . . is
encouraged to advise his or her client about the dispute resolution process options
available to him or her and to assist him or her in the selection of the technique or
procedure . . . deemed appropriate . . . .”); COLO. R. OF PROF. COND. R. 2.1 (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be
relevant to the client’s situation. In a matter involving or expected to involve litigation, a lawyer should advise the client of alternative forms of dispute resolution that
might reasonably be pursued to attempt to resolve the legal dispute or to reach the
legal objective sought.”); DEL. R. S. CT. 71(B) (Delaware State Bar Association Statement of Principles of Lawyer Conduct) (“Before choosing a forum, a lawyer should
review with the client all alternatives, including alternate methods of dispute resolution.”); HAW. R. OF PROF. COND. R. 2.1, cmt. 5 (Similarly, when a matter is likely to
involve litigation, it may be necessary under Rule 1.4 to inform the client of forms of
dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation.); Louisiana Mediation Act, LA. R.S. § 9:4102 (“Counsel are encouraged to discuss with their
clients the appropriateness of using mediation in any civil case pending in the
courts.”); N.J. CT. R. 1.40-1 (“Attorneys have a responsibility to become familiar with
available [court-provided dispute resolution] programs and inform their clients of
them.”).
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[a]dvises the client at the outset of the availability of alternative dispute resolution.”30
The California Attorney Guidelines for Civility and Professionalism similarly exhort lawyers to “raise and explore with [clients and
opposing counsel] the possibility of settlement and alternative dispute resolution in every case as soon possible and, when appropriate,
during the course of litigation.”31
While Alabama does not appear to have any statewide rules regarding a lawyer’s duty to advise clients about ADR options, specific
Alabama federal district court rules, such as those in the Middle District Court, “encourage litigants to consider the salutary benefits of
resolving their dispute at an early stage through voluntary
mediation.”32
Texas and New Mexico have taken the approach of adding aspirational creeds to their regulatory codes of professional conduct.33
For example, the Texas Lawyer’s Creed states: “I will advise my client regarding the availability of mediation, arbitration and other alternative methods of resolving and settling disputes.”34 However, as
one scholar notes, “[t]he problem with an aspirational statement is
that it is just that–aspirational. While lawyers’ creeds certainly recommend the most commendable behavior, they purposefully lack enforcement mechanisms . . . .”35
A number of states have adopted the third approach vis-à-vis
lawyer conduct, with weaker language in their rules that merely references the possibility that it “may be necessary [for lawyers] to inform clients about ADR alternatives” rather than requiring or even
encouraging ADR discussions with clients.36 The Ethics Committee
30. Hawaii State Bar Guidelines of Professional Courtesy & Civility Rule 11
(2014).
31. STATE BAR OF CAL., California Attorney Guidelines of Civility and Professionalism § 13 (2007), http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/9/documents/Civility/Atty-Civili
ty-Guide-Revised_Sept-2014.pdf.
32. M.D. Ala. Loc. Rule 16.1(a); see also Alternative Dispute Resolution Plan,
N.D. Ala., http://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/sites/alnd/files/forms/ADR%20Plan.pdf.
33. See N.M. R. LAW. Creed (1999); TEXAS LAWYER’S CREED – A MANDATE FOR
PROFESSIONALISM II (11) (1989). Breger, supra note 12, at 452-53 n.150 (stating that,
in addition to Texas, the states of New Mexico, Ohio, and Georgia also have lawyers’
creeds which incorporate similar aspirational language and goals). See OHIO R. GOV.
B., App. 5, A Lawyer’s Creed (1997).
34. See TEXAS LAWYER’S CREED – A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM II(11), supra
note 33.
35. Breger, supra note 12, at 453.
36. See ARIZ. R. OF PROF. COND., E.R. 2.1, cmt. 5 (“when a matter is likely to
involve litigation, it may be necessary under E.R. 1.4 to inform the client of forms of
dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation”).
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of New Hampshire, for example, appears to adopt this approach, advising that “Attorneys seeking to determine the scope of the duty to
communicate under this rule should also review ABA Comment 5 to
Rule 2.1. That Comment states that, when a matter is likely to involve litigation, Rule 1.4 may require a lawyer “to inform the client of
forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation.” This comment may prove important given the overlap of Rules 2.1 and 1.4, the increasingly important role of alternative
dispute resolution in litigation, and the implications this duty might
have for a lawyer’s civil liability.37
Other states that fall into this category include: Arizona, Florida,
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming, as well as the District of Columbia.38 Additionally, these
states refer to client ADR communications in the commentary accompanying the rules rather than within the text of any specific rule.
Because the “[c]omments do not add obligations . . . but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with [the rules],” a lawyer’s potential duty to discuss ADR with clients in these states is, at best, a mere
suggestion.39
A number of states conflate the obligation to notify clients of
ADR options with pretrial planning. For example, while not specifically mandating that attorneys advise clients about alternatives to
trial, the Illinois Supreme Court requires attorneys to consider the
advisability of alternative dispute resolution as well as the possibility

37. N.H. R. OF PROF. COND. Rule 1.4, Ethics Committee cmt. (emphasis added).
38. See ARIZ. R. OF PROF. COND., E.R. 2.1, cmt. 5; FLA. ST. BAR Rule 4-2.1, cmt.
Offering Advice; IND. R. OF PROF. COND., Rule 2.1, cmt. 5; I.C.A. Rule 32:2.1; ME. R. OF
PROF. COND., Rule 2.1, cmt. 5; MISS. R. OF PROF. COND., Rule 2.1, cmt. 5; NEB. CT. R.
OF PROF. COND. § 3-502.1, cmt. 5; N.C. BAR RULES, Ch. 2, Rule 2.1, cmt. 5; N.D. R.
PROF. COND., Rule 2.1, cmt. 5; OHIO R. OF PROF. COND., Rule 2.1, cmt. 5; OKLA. R. OF
PROF. COND., Rule 2.1, cmt. 5; R.I. SUP. CT. RULES, ART. V, R. OF PROF. COND., Rule
2.1, cmt. Offering Advice; S.C. R. OF PROF. COND., RULE 2.1, cmt. 5; S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS Ch. 16–18 App., R. OF PROF. COND., Rule 2.1, cmt. 5; UTAH R. OF PROF. COND.,
Rule 2.1, cmt. 5; VT. R. OF PROF. COND., Rule 2.1, cmt. 5 (recognizing “the increasingly
important role being played by alternative dispute resolution in litigation”); WASH. R.
OF PROF. COND., Rule 2.1, cmt. 5; W. VA. R. OF PROF. COND., Rule 2.1, cmt. 5; WIS. SUP.
CT. R. 20:2.1, cmt. 5; WYO. R. OF PROF. COND., Rule 2.1, cmt. 5; D.C. R. OF PROF.
COND., Rule 2.1, cmt. 5.
39. See Breger, supra note 12, at 460.
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of settlement during the initial case management conference.40 Similarly, Maryland and Tennessee attorneys may be required to consider
alternative dispute resolution at pretrial conferences.41
Montana requires every party to file a “Preliminary Pretrial
Statement” that addresses the “feasibility [of] invoking alternative
dispute resolution procedures.”42 Nevada’s rules, on the other hand,
simply state that “pretrial conferences shall include settlement negotiations.”43 ADR case management duties, however, do not necessarily encompass a client consultation requirement because, while
pretrial conference settlement discussions may include the judge,
they are often between the lawyers and may take place without client
input.44
Finally, the rules in Kansas, Michigan, and Pennsylvania reflect
the fourth “implied in the rules” approach regarding a lawyer’s duty
to counsel clients about ADR. In these states, attorneys only must
convey an ADR proposal by a court or opposing counsel to the
client.45
As a brief aside, one wonders if the debate as to whether the
Rules create an obligation, mandatory or hortatory, for lawyers to advise clients on the use of ADR has become a purely academic one.
40. See ILL. ST. S. CT. R. 218(a)(6)-(7). But see Thomas E. Spahn, A Practical
Road Map to the New Illinois Ethics Rules, 35 S. ILL. U. L.J. 27, 50 (2010) (noting that
Illinois’s most recent Rules of Professional Conduct specifically left out a sentence
from the comment to ABA Model Rule 2.1 which explained that a lawyer representing
a client may have a duty to inform the client of ADR options).
41. See Breger, supra note 12, at 467-68 (citing MD. R. CIV. P. 2-504.1(c)(1) and
TENN. R. CIV. P. 16.03(7)).
42. See id. at 470 (citing D. MONT. CT. CIV. R. 235-1).
43. See id. at 468 (citing NEV. CT. R. 9(B)).
44. See id. at 446.
45. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-216 (Supp. 2009) (noting that, during mandatory
pretrial conferences, a court may consider and take appropriate action concerning
matters such as alternative dispute resolution of the claim in the dispute therefore
attorneys should advise clients of this); Kan. Bar Ass’n Prof. Ethics Advisory Comm.,
Informal Op. 94-01 (1994) (“When a lawyer’s professional judgment indicates ADR is
a viable option, the lawyer should discuss that option with the client, whether or not
the issue is raised by opposing counsel or the court” and “[i]f an ADR technique is
proposed by opposing counsel or the court, the lawyer must advise the client of the
benefits and disadvantages of the ADR techniques proposed.”);; State Bar of Mich.,
Standing Comm. on Prof. & Jud. Ethics, Op. RI-255 (1996) (“[I]f counsel for the opposing party offers to resolve the pending dispute through alternative dispute resolution
forums, a lawyer is required to convey that offer to the client.”); Penn. Bar Ass’n.,
Comm. on Legal & Prof. Responsibility, Informal Op. 90-125 (1991) (stating that Rule
1.2 and Rule 1.4, read together, obligate a lawyer to inform a client when the opposing
side suggests mediation); see Breger, supra note 12, at 464-65 (discussing Kansas,
Michigan, and Pennsylvania as states that have an implied duty to inform clients of
ADR).
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Given the ubiquity of ADR processes in most law practices, a lawyer’s
failure to consider or discuss alternatives to trial with a client certainly would at least raise the specter of legal malpractice. Even as
early as 1968, one court already had concluded that an attorney has
an obligation to a client “to attempt to effectuate a reasonable settlement of the . . . action where the general standards of professional
care [require] that the most reasonable manner of disposing of the
action was by settlement.”46
Assuming for the moment that lawyers do have some level of responsibility to inform clients of ADR options, what would the scope of
such a duty be, and how would lawyers discharge it? Regarding
scope, such a duty may be understood to be either specific or more
general. A more specifically-envisioned duty might require lawyers to
conduct detailed analyses of their clients’ cases in order to recommend a particular DR option to their clients.47 A more generalized
duty might only require that lawyers inform clients that there are
ADR options available to explore.48 This general option, however,
would not appear to be sufficient to permit clients to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.49
Even if a generic discussion or presentation of ADR options
might suffice for legally sophisticated clients, should communications
not always be tailored to specific clients? If the goal is to maximize
client awareness and autonomy (rather than litigation efficiency), generic presentations arguably would be inadequate for certain clients
or client groups. Given the rigorous debate over the existence of this
duty, the absence of voices advocating on behalf of client populations
that might be affected in particular or negative ways is surprising
and disturbing.

46. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d, 136, 151 (1968). This trend has continued. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gisriel, 409 Md. 331, 974 A.2d 331
(2009) (finding attorney to be in violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4 for failing to discuss the meaning and consequences of the mediation clause in a contract
with his clients).
47. See Breger, supra note 12, at 451 (citing Edwin H. Greenebaum, Lawyers’
Agenda for Understanding Alternative Dispute Resolution, 68 IND. L.J. 771, 788
(1993)).
48. See id. at 439.
49. As space does not permit a nuanced discussion of the scope of any ethically-,
or otherwise, required mandatory ADR notice or a detailed exploration of possible
practical options for its provision, the author plans a future article on the topic.
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Assuming that most lawyers either fulfill their duty to, or voluntarily, discuss ADR processes with their clients, it is alarming that
the debate surrounding the imposition of any such mandate has not
involved a consideration of the possible adverse consequences of
these alternatives for women in certain circumstances as well as for
all potentially vulnerable parties50 or between parties of significantly
unequal power.51
This section will address two particular themes that have
emerged regarding the experience of women as represented parties in
ADR, with a focus on the mediation process. The first theme relates
to a negative process-oriented gender differential that may arise
when women participate in the more informal ADR processes. The
second theme pertains to negative gender differentials in outcomes or
results.
With regard to the first theme, focusing on a negative processoriented gender differential, many scholars, practicing mediators,
and lawyer-advocates believe that ADR, and mandatory mediation
more specifically,52 may fail women and weaker, less assertive parties under certain circumstances.53 For example, this process danger
50. “Vulnerable” in this context encompasses a broad set of dimensionalities. For
example, at least one commentator has argued that a lawyer’s mandatory ADR notice
may presents risks to medical malpractice defendants due to the negative consequences of the public accessibility of out-of-court settlement records. See, e.g., Katerina P. Lewinbuk, First, Do No Harm: The Consequences of Advising Clients About
Litigation Alternatives in Medical Malpractice Cases, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. &
ETHICS 416 (2012).
51. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, ADR and the Dispossessed: Recent Books About the
Deformalization Movement, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 45 (1988); Richard Delgado et al.,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359; Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing
Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of
ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991). Because the focus of this article is the intersectionality of the lawyer’s mandatory ADR notice and possible gender bias in those alternative processes, it will not explicitly distinguish feminist critiques that are
concerned primarily with the experience of women who are unrepresented in these
fora. See Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It’s Here to Stay
and Much Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196, 221 (2003). Clearly, the presence of
competent counsel mitigates much of the risk about which the critiques caution –
much, but not all. See infra.
52. See Grillo, supra note 51, at 1585-92.
53. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies, The
Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator’s Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 949, 954 (1997). At least one scholar has remarked upon a recent decline in what
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is, some assert, particularly acute when female victims of intimate
partner violence (IPV) are mandated to mediate with their abusers, a
grave concern as it is estimated that approximately one quarter of all
women will suffer physical violence in intimate relationships during
their lifetimes.54
While men suffer physical violence in domestic partnerships, women are more likely to be victims of more severe forms of intimate
abuse.55 One scholar reports data estimating that over 60% of the
more than 7.7 million intimate-partner rapes and physical assaults
that occur in the U.S. annually involve female victims and that intimate partners commit one-third of all homicides of women.56 These
data compel mediators to take seriously the obvious physical risks
inherent in mediations involving parties with a history of IPV.
he perceives to be “legal scholarship critical of key aspects of ADR[ ]” and asks “why
has this been so[, positing perhaps that] “it [is] . . . linked to a ‘failing faith’ in adjudication and our collective pressing need to embrace an encompassing ‘alternative[,]’ [or
that] . . . policymakers seem to care little for chasing after facts about ADR because
‘that train has already left the station[.]’” Yamamoto, supra note 4, at 1056. While
beyond the scope of this article, the debate regarding mandatory arbitration in the
consumer context also can be framed as a process danger involving a power balance
based upon arbitration clauses within contracts of adhesion that offer little recourse
to the consumer against the party with stronger bargaining position exercising its
contractual right to arbitrate. See, e.g., Anjanette H. Raymond, It Is Time the Law
Begins to Protect Consumers from Significantly One-Sided Arbitration Clauses Within
Contracts of Adhesion, 91 NEB. L. REV. 666, 701 (2013).
54. U.N. Secretary-General, In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against Women, Table 2, U.N. DOC. A/61/122/Add.1.
55. Noel Semple, Mandatory Family Mediation and the Settlement Mission: A
Feminist Critique, 24 CAN. J.W.L. 207, 216 (2012). This article will not address the socalled “gender symmetry debate” concerning intimate partner violence. For those interested in a scholarly analysis of what some have framed as an “ideological polemic”
undertaking, see Michael S. Kimmel, “Gender Symmetry” in Domestic Violence - A
Substantive and Methodological Research Review, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1332,
1336 (2002). Nor will it take a position regarding “the possibility that not all violence
in relationships is abusive” and that aggression in intimate partnerships should be
differentiated by types and degrees of aggression along a continuum. Tamara L.
Kuennen, Stuck on Love, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 171, 179 n.48 (2013) (citing EVAN
STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 104-06
(2007)). Some have suggested, however, that, from a policy perspective, focusing on
“the most dangerous, and always-gendered, type of intimate partner violence, ‘coercive control’[,]” id. at 179, and moving away from “the current victimization narrative”
might create a narrative with a much broader public appeal. Id. at 181 n.52. This
extreme category of aggression, alternatively known as “patriarchal terrorism” and
“coercive controlling violence,” is particularly perilous in ADR processes as it may
lead “to the total domination of the abuser over the victim.” Semple, supra note 55, at
217.
56. Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All You Have Is a Hammer: Society’s Ineffective
Response to Intimate Partner Violence, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 919, 920-22 (2011) (citations omitted).
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Mediators all are aware of the possibility of, and take precautions to
prevent, tragedies such as that described in People v. May, in which a
husband was convicted of first degree murder with the “lying in wait”
special circumstance enhancement for stabbing his wife in their mediator’s office building shortly after an unsuccessful mediation
session.57
IPV patterns of physical violence, coercion, and attendant control
have been causally related to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD),58 a disorder characterized by physiological changes to the
brain that impair critical judgment, memory, and concentration and
that create the risk of attention and logic problems59 and self-destructive behavior.60 Research findings reveal that IPV victims suffering PTSD experience cognitive difficulties that affect their
perception and memory and that lead to feelings of helplessness and
increased levels of depression and anxiety.61
These symptoms, as well as the physical injuries and pain that
they endure,62 may compromise the mediation process itself when
57. People v. May, No. A113365, 2007 WL 594468 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2007),
rev. denied, (May 09, 2007). This case is the stuff of nightmares for everyone involved
in this work. At the conclusion of an unsatisfactory mediation to discuss their failed
marriage and child custody arrangements, the husband exited and waited in his car
while the victim remained in the mediator’s office before returning to the office building armed with a pair of scissors and confronting his wife. Id. at *5-*6. When observers found them, his wife had been stabbed over 100 times in her upper body, face,
neck, and shoulders. Id. The husband’s first degree murder conviction was affirmed,
and he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Id. at *8.
58. Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The Science
and Admissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
9, 17, 34 (2001).
59. Id. at 26-27.
60. Criteria for PTSD, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [DSM-5].
61. MARGARET J. HUGHES & LORING JONES, WOMEN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND
POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (PTSD) 20 (2000), https://numerons.files.wordpress
.com/2012/04/domestic-violence-and-ptsd.pdf.
62. These symptoms may be exacerbated in victims who sustain minor head injuries or concussions from blows to the head and face, or from being severely shaken,
which can result in damage to the brain. See D.L. Rhatigan, et al., The Impact of
Posttraumatic Symptoms on Women’s Commitment to a Hypothetical Violent Relationship: A Path Analytic Test of Posttraumatic Stress, Depression, Shame, and Self-Efficacy on Investment Model Factors, 3 PSYCHOL. TRAUMA: THEORY, RES., PRAC., AND
POLICY 181 (2011). Studies show that women who report having received these injuries from partners display evidence of cognitive deficits in concentration, attention,
and memory; obvious confusion; and poor judgment, poor problem-solving, and poor
decision-making. Id. Neurobiological research indicates that there are other alterations in brain morphology that individuals exposed to trauma present, i.e., reductions
in cortical thickness in regions of the brain that are involved in flexible decision-making, emotion regulation, and response inhibition. See N. Sadeh, et al., Neurobiological
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the decision-making ability or critical judgment of a victim of IPV has
been impaired such that it interferes with her competence to participate meaningfully. For example, PTSD symptoms may influence a
victim’s ability to evaluate and prioritize settlement options in mediation.63 Lawyers experienced with clients suffering PTSD note that
self-destructive symptoms may manifest when victims propose or appear willing to accept settlements or engage in other behaviors that
have the potential to negatively affect their legal matters, impacting
both legal processes such as negotiation and mediation and the results of those processes.64
The threat of physical danger is not the only process-related risk
to women in these situations. For example, feminist and other critiques posit mandatory mediation as a potential institutional perpetuation of victim oppression.65 Victim advocates caution that mediation
has the potential to create an environment that not only may risk
victims’ physical safety, but will replicate their gender, racial, class,
or educational subordination and exacerbate relational and societal
power imbalances amongst the parties.66 As one scholar summarized,
power is not monolithic, and it can be exerted economically, intellectually, physically, emotionally, and, in the legal sphere,
procedurally.67
The dynamics of abusive relationships often involve all of these
power elements: economic; intellectual, including not only a possible
inequality of education but also of access to, control of, or expertise
about, information; physical/sexual; emotional/psychological; and, in
cases entering the legal system, procedural. Some of these elements
may not be readily discernible, even to those closely observing the
Indicators of Disinhibition in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 36 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 3076 (2015).
63. Captain Evan R. Seamone, Attorneys as First Responders: Recognizing the
Destructive Nature of PostTraumatic Stress Disorder on the Combat Veteran’s Legal
Decision-Making Process, 202 MIL. L. REV. 144, 166-67 (2009).
64. Id. at 164-68. Professor Leigh Goodmark has written about advocates who
argue that “women who have been battered are incapable of making authentic
choices[.]” Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of
Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 28
(2009) (“Accepting that women who have been battered are incapable of engaging in
independent deliberation devalues these women as members of the political society
and invites and justifies what some might characterize as paternalism on their behalf”). I am not among such advocates; PTSD is not a “gender” construct.
65. See Grillo, supra note 51, at 1585-92.
66. See, e.g., Semple, supra note 55, at 208.
67. Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth’s Story: Exploring Power Imbalances in Divorce
Mediation, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 553, 575 (1995).
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interactions.68 The power imbalances in such relationships often are
so deeply entrenched that, regardless of the skill of the mediator, any
agreement resulting from the mediation process might be the product
of those coercive dynamics.69 Exploiting a woman’s ethic of care and
appealing to her eagerness to cooperate might force her “to acquiesce
in [her] own oppression.”70
Moreover, the confidential nature of informal processes such as
mediation shields the potentially criminal conduct of perpetrators
from public view.71 The very act of according a batterer the “right” of
self-determination in a process that may have legal consequences
grants this behavior an unacceptable imprimatur of institutional approval and normalizes violence.72 It also “deprives women of the clear
societal sanction that should accompany certain types of behavior”
and may imply that they share responsibility for the abusive conduct.73 Victims of IPV should not be made to feel that they must bargain for their safety.74
Mediation confidentiality poses other dangers when it involves a
direct confrontation between two disputants of disparate power, including not only female victims of IPV, but also racial minorities, the
poor, and other disempowered parties in certain situations. Perhaps
68. See Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making About
Divorce Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
145, 151 (2003).
69. Hughes, supra 67, at 574-76.
70. Grillo, supra note 51, at 1610.
71. See generally Hughes, supra 67.
72. The future-focus of the mediation process generally discourages a discussion
or distribution of blame, accountability, legal rights, or principles. Accordingly, in a
court-mandated mediation program, the abuser may perceive that a court has accorded him the power to negotiate the terms of, or apportion blame for, the abuse. See,
e.g., Semple, supra note 55, at 216-18. Although mandatory mediation of abuse cases
may promote court efficiencies, it can appear to an IPV victim that her access to justice has been denied in a societally-recognized court system by failing to punish past
violence and by preventing future attacks. See, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of
Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (1984). But see Ver Steegh, supra note 68, at 181-82
(“[D]ivorce mediation need not supplant the use of the criminal system. If an abuse
survivor chooses to do so, she can file criminal charges, pursue a protective order, and
mediate the divorce. Use of the criminal courts is not an exclusive remedy. Second, a
growing body of evidence suggests that applying criminal sanctions may not deter
further abuse. . . . [T]there is some evidence that mediation prevents future violence.
Researchers . . . report that voluntary multi-session mediation is more effective in
preventing future violence than either coerced mediation or lawyer negotiations. (Citations omitted)).
73. Leigh Goodmark, Alternative Dispute Resolution and The Potential for Gender Bias, 39 JUDGES’ J. 21, 25 (2000).
74. See Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism, supra note 64, at 15.
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one of the most serious critiques is reflected in the textured debate
regarding the potential impact of ADR processes on the development
of law pertaining to issues of public concern,75 i.e., confidential settlements prevent the development of legal principles and rights in matters with significant public dimensions. To paraphrase one prominent
scholar, “race and gender critiques of ADR” as well as victim and civil
rights advocates caution that powerful, hard-won legal protections
can be overlooked or deliberately ignored in informal processes, particularly when unrepresented parties are involved.76 Also, social-psychological research indicates that people are more likely to act upon
their biases or impulses in an informal ADR-type setting than in a
more formal adjudicatory setting.
Some have argued that most court-related family mediation programs have responded to these critiques and that mediation is now,
or can be, designed to better protect the interests and safety of victims of IPV and other potentially disadvantaged parties.77 Mediations involving IPV, for example, generally are conducted in separate
sessions using a caucus-driven, evaluative model.78 Particularly for
female victims of domestic abuse, “face-to-face” intimidation and
shame in open court are much more traumatic than facilitated dialogue in shuttle-style mediation.79
75. See Yamamoto, supra note 4, at 1067. See also Andre R. Imbrogno, Using
ADR to Address Issues of Public Concern: Can ADR Become an Instrument for Social
Oppression?, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 855 (1999).
76. Goodmark, Alternative Dispute Resolution and The Potential for Gender Bias,
supra note 73, at 24.
77. Mary Adkins, Moving Out of the 1990s: An Argument for Updating Protocol
on Divorce Mediation in Domestic Abuse Cases, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97, 129-31
(2010). See also Lerman, supra note 72, at 98-99 (noting that mediation may be potentially more effective than prosecution or litigation options when these options reflect
the same social values which have historically prevented effective intervention in IPV
cases). Too, from a normative perspective, there are some experts who assert that
there are various levels of violence and that not all acts or histories of violence will
have an impact on the parties’ balance of power in a mediation or other informal ADR
processes. See, e.g., Semple, supra note 55, at 217. Others cite data that report a relative gender symmetry in violent acts, frequently acute or situational. See, e.g., Murray
A. Straus, Gender Symmetry in Partner Violence: Evidence and Implications for Prevention and Treatment, in PREVENTING PARTNER VIOLENCE: RESEARCH AND EVIDENCEBASED INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 245-71 (D.J. Whitaker & J.R. Lutzker eds., 2009).
78. Adkins, supra note , at 129-31.
79. Studies have reported that significant majorities of litigants thought the
court processes in divorce proceedings made the system “impersonal, intimidating,
and intrusive” and that they escalated the level of conflict and distrust “to a further
extreme.” Ver Steegh, supra note 68, at 163. These negative impressions are lasting: a
former divorce litigant told an author that, ten years after her divorce trial, it remained “the worst experience of my life.” Adkins, supra note 77, at 128.
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Additional pro-mediation arguments relate to financial considerations. Not only is litigation an expensive proposition that takes
longer to conclude, but “[s]tudies [also] have consistently shown that
rates of compliance with mediated agreements are higher than they
are for judicial decrees . . . This is particularly important at a time
when, for every dollar owed in child support in the United States, the
overall compliance rate is fifty-five cents.”80
The mediation process itself is, some have theorized, a feminized
construct within the legal system,81 a statement that requires two
explicit caveats. First, it is essential to carefully distinguish, as did
Professor Naomi Cahn, a “feminine” process focused on connections
from one concentrated solely on ending the subjugation of women, a
“feminist” process.82 I do not believe these notions are mutually exclusive, and, in fact, often are mutually reinforcing. However, in this
particular context, it is important to note the distinction.
Somewhat relatedly, the second caveat pertains to the negative
associations arising from the labels “feminine” or “feminist.” Of
course, there is no homogenized paradigm of “feminist” theory or of
the analytical orientations of those who self-identify as “feminists,”83
nor is there likely to be a distinct set of characteristics that define the
adjective “feminine.” As both terms have been used to explicitly, and
to subtly, insult, stigmatize, and discredit in both public and private
discourse, I seek only to highlight “the tyranny of language or of prior
experience,”84 even within seemingly positive contexts and
exchanges.
Setting aside the caveats, the more “feminized” process of mediation is a natural platform for each woman to construct and communicate her own narrative rather than to assort organic situations,
perhaps artificially, into the highly conscribed and silo-ized legal categories available in what has been described as our patriarchal legal
system.85 Mediation narratives are personally unique to each individual mediation, based upon the exploration and clarification of party
80. Adkins, supra note 77, at 127.
81. See Christine B. Harrington & Janet Rifkin, The Gender Organization of Mediation: Implications for the Feminization of Legal Practice (Inst. for Legal Studies
Working Papers Series 4, 40, 1989).
82. Naomi R. Cahn, Defining Feminist Litigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 3-4
(1991).
83. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 83335 (1989).
84. Gordon A. Christenson, Thinking Things, Not Words: Irvin Rutter’s Pragmatic Jurisprudence of Teaching, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1298 (1993).
85. See generally Kate McCabe, Comment, A Forum for Women’s Voices: Mediation Through A Feminist Jurisprudential Lens, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 459, 468 (2001).
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interests and upon relational ethics rather than abstract principles.86
According to noted psychologist and feminist Carol Gilligan, a woman’s “voice” is very different than that of a man’s: men organize social relationships hierarchically and subscribe to an ethic of justice or
of individual rights while women prioritize interpersonal connectedness and responsibility and adhere to an ethic of care.87 Mediation
can provide a space that accommodates the expression of a woman’s
voice without formalistic evidentiary restrictions and that allows her
to participate in the design of a resolution that is more responsive to
her specific values and needs.
Awareness and mastery of these process characteristics, as well
as the safeguards that have been put into place in response to feminist and other critiques, certainly have improved the experience of
victims of IPV in mediation programs, yet skeptics remain. The point
of this article is not to settle the debate on whether, or the extent to
86. Danya Shocair Reda, Critical Conflicts Between First-Wave and Feminist
Critical Approaches to Alternative Dispute Resolution, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 193,
211-12 (2011).
87. Deborah L. Rhode, The “No-Problem” Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1785 (1991) (citing, inter alia, CAROL GILLIGAN, IN
A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 1-2 (1982)).
From the client perspective, this corresponds to scholar Christine Littleton’s discussion of “Robin West’s exploration of the ‘connection thesis’ of feminism,” which describes women as connected to others and as fearing abandonment and isolation.
Christine A. Littleton, Women’s Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 49-50 (1989). In her
canonical article, Portia in A Different Voice: Speculations on a Women’s Lawyering
Process, Carrie Menkel-Meadow draws upon Carol Gilligan’s work to explore how women’s voices may redefine the practice of law by expressing an ethic of care and a
responsibility for others that enables them to better understand a range of client
needs and objectives. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia In A Different Voice: Speculations on a Women’s Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 57 (1985). Linguist Deborah Tannen’s research on gendered communication demonstrates that
women, both as lawyers and as parties, may be more effective in the more informal
dispute resolutions environments because they are more comfortable communicating
their needs and engaging in problem-solving. “We note[ ] . . . the . . . work of the
linguist, Deborah Tannen, who posits that women, who use emotional language and
articulate needs with ease, might actually be better at “mediation talk” than some
men.” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Trina Taught Me: Reflections on Mediation, Inequality, Teaching and Life, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1413, 1427 (1997) (citing DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON’T UNDERSTAND: MEN AND WOMEN IN CONVERSATION (1990);
DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 TO 5: HOW WOMEN’S AND MEN’S CONVERSATION
STYLES AFFECT WHO GETS HEARD, WHO GETS CREDIT, AND WHAT GETS DONE AT WORK
(1994)). Some view conceptualizing an “ethic of care,” whether as a uniquely feminine
trait, or “voice,”; a feminist ethic; or a style of lawyering; as a “problem of essentialism.” See Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1051 (1992).
“By identifying characteristics as male or female, we ignore differences based on race,
class, sexual orientation, or other significant social and cultural experiences which
shape how we view the world and act in it.” Id.
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which, violence and the culture of battering can severely interfere
with a woman’s ability to assert oppositional positions against her
aggressor in mediation. Rather, it is to focus attention on the issue
inherent in this specific theme, that there may be negative gender
differentials for women in ADR fora, particularly when victims of intimate partner violence are mandated to mediate with their abusers.
The second theme that has emerged regarding the experience of
women in ADR, with an emphasis in this article on mediation, focuses more on potential negative gender differentials in results. Perhaps because of what scholar Carrie Menkel-Meadow labels a
“serious ’baseline’ problem in empirical analysis of dispute resolution
processes,”88 there is not a significant body of research that evaluates
the substantive “fairness” of mediated agreements, particularly in
cases involving parties of unequal power.89 However, a belief persists
that women have objectively inferior outcomes in mediation than do
men.90
What data exist, however, are inconsistent as to the hypothesis
that women suffer worse outcomes empirically in mediation than do
their male counterparts.91 Several studies of divorce cases, for example, report results for women in mediation similar to those in litigation and negotiated settlements.92 Conversely, in one other study,
divorce mediation produced agreements for “joint custody” far more
often than such custody was awarded in court decisions, a result that
may support the premise that women, who seek primary custody
more often, fare worse in mediation than men.93
88. CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, Dispute Resolution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LEGAL RESEARCH 596 (2012).
89. See Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Mediation and Social Injustice: Risk and Opportunities, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 23 (2012). However,
the absence of research confirming the fairness of outcomes does not prove the absence of substantive fairness at the micro-level. Id. at 23-24.
90. See TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS, DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS AND GENDERED PARTIES 189-96 (2009).
91. Vicki C. Jackson, Empiricism, Gender, and Legal Pedagogy: An Experiment
in a Federal Courts Seminar at Georgetown University Law Center, 83 GEO. L.J. 461,
511 (1994) (noting that data from a study of mediation and adjudication in small
claim civil cases in New Mexico were inconsistent with the hypothesis that mediation
is unfair to women because they are likely to have “worse” outcomes).
92. See Stevens Clarke et al., A Report on Current Research Findings–Implications for Courts and Future Research Needs 19–20 (St. Just. Inst.) (Oct.
15-16, 1993) (unpublished working paper).
93. See Bush & Folger, supra note 89, at 23 n.76 (citing Roz Zinner, Joint Custody: Smart Solution or Problematic Plan, ADR RESOURCES, http://www.adrr.com/adr4/
joint.htm. Another study reported that racial minorities more often than not achieved
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Data in other settings are similarly variable. In a study of party
satisfaction with the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal’s voluntary mediation program, women were more likely to settle than
men and appeared to be more satisfied than men with their mediation results even though average monetary settlements for men were
higher by seven percent.94 Further, while at least some empirical
studies of mediated outcomes in court-annexed mediation suggest
that women and minorities may be disadvantaged in mediation as
compared to the courtroom,95 other studies of small claims randomly
assigned to mediation and adjudication reported that outcomes for
women were better in mediation than in adjudication.96 Non-empirical, observational data based upon first-person accounts of mediation
participants, however, are more consistent. These reports suggest
that most mediators and attorney advocates have been confounded by
female parties and clients who have, for their own reasons and despite reality testing and strong advice to the contrary, agreed to
terms that were, in the reporters’ opinions, obviously and objectively
unfavorable in economic terms.97
Setting aside the empirical evidence, or the lack thereof, there
are numerous rationales posited for any gendered differential outcomes that may exist. Many argue that, because women, more than
poorer outcomes in mediation than in court, whereas the reverse was true for nonminority parties. See Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants’ Ethnicity and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 767, 788-94 (1996).
94. Gerald P. Heckman, Laverne A. Jacobs & Justice Anne L. MacTavish, Eds.,
Dialogue between Courts and Tribunals - Essays in Administrative Law and Justice
(2001-2007) (Montreal: Les Éditions Thémis, 2008), 27 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST.
485, 494 (2009) (book review).
95. See LaFree & Rack, supra note 93, at 788–794 (reporting that minority claimants consistently received less, and minority respondents consistently paid more,
than non-minorities and had comparatively worse outcomes than in adjudication, but
that they perceived mediation to be fairer and less biased than adjudication).
96. See, e.g., James Alfini et al., What Happens When Mediation Is Institutionalized?: To the Parties, Practitioners, and Host Institutions, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 307, 316-17 (1994).
97. For example, consider this quote from an experienced mediator: “Very clearly
she was negotiating to her disadvantage. Neutrality would allow . . . it all to happen
because she was choosing it. You are raising [the issue] and she is saying, ‘No I want
to settle, I want it out of my hair, I don’t want to focus anymore, I’m sick of this . . .
You [try] reality testing: ‘If you got legal advice and found that there are different
outcomes possible for you?’ but she is still wanting [to settle]. I have been caught, and
my co-mediator too, [in] allowing [parties] to go ahead [and settle]. Making a choice
about whether it goes ahead knowing there is a disadvantage, that’s one that has
occurred. Yes. I still struggle with it.” Susan Douglas, Neutrality in Mediation: A
Study of Mediator Perceptions, 8 QUEENSLAND U. TECH. L. JUST. J. 139, 146 (2008).
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men, have a relational concept of self,98 they may feel compelled to
engage with, and maintain their connections to, other parties in mediations, even when this puts them at what others might perceive as
a great disadvantage.99 This is particularly true where children are
involved; women frequently bargain away financial benefits and
property in divorce mediations where custody is concerned.100 Research indicates that female parties in mediation are often more concerned with the emotional aspects of their cases than with the
compensatory issues.101
Others argue that women will and do fare worse in mediation
because of the procedural delegitimization of anger, and, concomitantly, of women. The socialized message is that, should a woman
dare to express anger, she will be discredited and labeled as a
“bitch.”102 Discouraging the expression of anger can disempower a
woman in mediation as well as in all other aspects of her life. Rather
than acknowledging the almost inevitable anger associated with
nearly every conflict, women are taught to suppress it or risk being
trivialized as irrational or petty. In divorces, angry women are often
characterized as selfish and are warned that their anger is a threat to
their children.103
This relates to another basis for any potential gender differential, the impact on women of power imbalances between disputing
parties. Particularly when mandatory ADR is involved, women may
experience the process as a very coercive legal intervention by someone more powerful. “Understanding gender as a social construction
with men in a superior position and women in an inferior position can
create a power imbalance in mediation where men set the terms and

98. See Margaret F. Brinig, Does Mediation Systematically Disadvantage Women?, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 10–11 (1995) (citing Trina Gillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1581 (1991)).
99. Grillo, supra note 51, at 1550.
100. REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 25 (1989).
101. RELIS, supra note 90, at 58-61.
102. See Grillo, supra note 51, at 1576–77.
103. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 51, at 1578.
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women acquiesce.”104 These imbalances can be compounded by mediator microsanctions that subtly punish non-conformity with existing
paradigms of “appropriate” gender behavior.105
Data on gender in the context of negotiation are often cited to
support the claims of relatively poor performance of women in mediation. The conventional wisdom is that women and men behave differently in a variety of bargaining and dispute resolution contexts.
However, the research on alleged gender differentials in negotiation
is highly complex, spans multiple disciplines, and examines numerous questions, and it has uncovered no single reason or simple account of how or why women and men may differ in negotiation
performance or results.106
Theoretically, any gender variable in negotiation has been explained as a product of socialization or of situational power.107 It also
has been posited that gender and status operate in an additive or
intersectionality model that incorporates a variety of personal characteristics that may impact others’ perceptions and expectations and
constrain negotiating behavior.108 A related theory broadly envisions
the negotiation process as a series of interactions in which women
affect, and are affected by, observers’ descriptive stereotypes and acculturated gender norms.109
Empirically, researchers have found that there is a “marginal
and inconsistent relationship between gender and negotiation outcomes.”110 Current studies indicate that there is no significant difference in male and female effectiveness in negotiating.111 As two of the
104. Deborah Rubin, Re-Feminizing Mediation Globally, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 355,
367–68 (2009). The issue of power imbalances in mediation is one that warrants its
own analysis, the scope of which exceeds this article. Their influence in the mediation
dynamic, however, cannot be underestimated, and sometimes, cannot be corrected.
105. See Grillo, supra note 51, at 1555-58. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What
Trina Taught Me, supra note 87, at 1418-19.
106. See Lu-in Wang, Negotiating The Situation: The Reasonable Person in Context, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1285, 1292-93 (2010).
107. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Teaching About Gender and Negotiation: Sex, Truths
and Videotape, 16 NEG. J. 357, 362-64 (2000).
108. Id.
109. Emily T. Amanatullah & Michael Morris, Negotiating Gender Roles: Gender
Differences in Assertive Negotiating Are Mediated by Women’s Fear of Backlash and
Attenuated When Negotiating on Behalf of Others, 98 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH.
256, 256 (2010).
110. See M. AFZALUR RAHIM, MANAGING CONFLICT IN ORGANIZATIONS 137 (2001).
111. See Charles Craver, Why Negotiation Assumptions about Women May Be
Wrong, 20 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 45 (March 2002).
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leading researchers on the effects of gender in negotiations have explained: “[m]ale and female negotiators sometimes fulfill the sex stereotypic expectations that men will be more competitive bargainers
and claim a greater portion of the pie than women, but people’s gender is not a consistent predictor of their negotiating behavior or performance . . . . [W]hat recent research has shown is that gender
effects on negotiation are contingent on situational factors that make
gender more or less relevant, salient, and influential.”112
The data on the situationality of gendered influences113 suggest
that individuals of both genders are highly attuned to the many contextual variables within negotiations, and studies consider how negotiators interpret and act upon those variables.114 In highly
ambiguous negotiations, for example, in which bargaining expectations about outcomes such as economic structures or quality standards are not clear, parties tend to fall back upon environmental
contexts and mental schema for cues on conducting the negotiation.115 Here, it becomes more likely that gender triggers, those situational cues that prompt male-female differentials in preferences and
expectations, i.e., stereotype threat, entitlement effect, etc., will influence negotiation behaviors and outcomes.116 By contrast, in low ambiguity situations, where terms and standards are more clearly
112. See Wang, supra note 106, at 1293 (quoting Iris Bohnet & Hannah Riley
Bowles, Gender in Negotiation: Introduction, 24 NEGOTIATION J. 389, 390 (2008)).
113. See Dorothy E. Weaver & Susan W. Coleman, The Literature on Women and
Negotiation: A Recap, 18 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 13, 19 (Spring 2012). Studies demonstrate
that women negotiate better than men when cases present the potential for collaborative outcomes. Id. (citing Carol Watson, Gender Versus Power as a Predictor of Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes, 10 NEGOT. J. 117 (1994)).
114. See id. at 20 (citing Gerard Callanan & David Perri, Teaching Conflict Management Using a Scenario-Based Approach, 81 J. OF ED. FOR BUS. 131 (2006)).
115. See Hannah Riley Bowles, Psychological Perspectives on Gender in Negotiation, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GENDER AND PSYCHOLOGY 472 (2013).
116. See Dina W. Pradel, Hannah Riley Bowles & Kathleen L. McGinn, When Does
Gender Matter in Negotiation?, NEGOTIATION (November 2005). “In high-ambiguity
industries, male participants negotiated [higher] salaries than the female participants[.] The competitive context cued negotiators to the traditionally “masculine” nature of the interactions, and the ambiguity in certain industries elicit[ed] different
negotiating behavior from men and women.” See id. at 4. Another element of bargaining that coincides with ambiguity is the parties’ attitude toward risk. See Robert H.
Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM, 1015, 1025 (1984-1985). When parties have different risk preferences, uncertainties in potential outcomes can differentially affect two parties. Id. If substantial
variance exists, or is even perceived to exist, among the possible outcomes, then the
relatively more risk-averse party is comparatively disadvantaged. Id. Negotiation
studies report that women tend to be more risk-averse than men. Amy J. Schmitz, Sex
Matters: Considering Gender in Consumer Contracting, 19 CARDOZO J.L & GENDER
437, 447 (2013).
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defined or bounded, outcomes are less likely to reflect gender triggers.117 Rather than indicating any inherent gender differences,
these triggers reflect mental schema, biases, and behavioral expectations that may impact negotiations.118
As in the mediation context, however, beliefs persist that gender
more fundamentally influences negotiation performance and results,119 perhaps increasing the susceptibility of women to internalizing, and experiencing backlash from, these gender schemata in
situations in which they are triggered or invoked.120 Experiments
suggest that women may moderate their negotiating approaches to
avoid anticipated backlash for gender stereotype violations, an adaptive response to bounded social constraints rather than any deficit in
skill or motivation.121
This is consistent with the findings in Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide, in which Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever report that women are less likely than men to ask for what
they want and that they avoid negotiation altogether in uncomfortable situations.122 Even when objective outcomes are equivalent, men
are deemed by evaluators to perform better in negotiations than are
women, and women “tend to rate their own work more harshly . . .
and are less likely to take credit for favorable results.”123 A woman’s
117. See Pradel et. al., supra note 116, at 3. There was no difference in the salaries
negotiated by male and female participants hired into low-ambiguity industries. See
id. at 4.
118. See id. at 3.
119. One scholar theorizes that these notions “reflect ‘commonsense’ beliefs about
gender. Among these assumptions are that men are logical and women emotional,
that females are “more manipulative” than males, and that men are more ‘agentically
competent’ than their female counterparts.” Francine Banner, Honest Victim Scripting in the Twitterverse, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 495, 512-13 (2016).
120. The influence of stereotype or gender schema may be situational. While not
conducted in association with ADR research, “[o]ne study showed that when Asian
American subjects’ Asian identity was made salient, they performed better on a test,
whereas when their gender identity was activated, they performed worse.” Joan C.
Williams, Double Jeopardy? An Empirical Study With Implications for the Debates
Over Implicit Bias and Intersectionality, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 185, 214 (2014)
(citing Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in
Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 81-82 (1999)). See also Deborah M.
Kolb, Negotiating in the Shadows of Organizations: Gender, Negotiation, and Change,
28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241 (2013).
121. Amanatullah & Morris, supra note 109, at 263-65.
122. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND
THE GENDER DIVIDE ix, 1-4, 9-10 (2003).
123. Deborah L. Rhode, The ‘No Problem’ Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, supra note 87, at 1753 (citing, inter alia, D. KOLB & G. COOLIDGE, HER
PLACE AT THE TABLE: A CONSIDERATION OF GENDER ISSUES IN NEGOTIATION 23
(Harvard Program on Negotiation Working Paper Series No. 88-5, 1988)).
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positive contributions often pass unremarked, but her mistakes are
more frequently noted. This can inhibit and impair performance in
ADR processes by decreasing confidence, increasing anxiety, and perpetuating self- and external performance-based gender
stereotypes.124
Interestingly, however, the data indicate that women will ask
and do improve their negotiated outcomes when they negotiate on behalf of a third party.125 This “other-advocacy” appears to alleviate
gender role incongruity, decreasing the risk of backlash and empowering women to negotiate more assertively for more favorable outcomes.126 Perhaps this offers some explanation for the somewhat
paradoxical perspectives that one scholar recently summarized:
[Trina] Grillo, Penelope Bryan, Martha Fineman and others
have long argued that in situations of informal and non-public
or not strong law-enforcing dispute processing (e.g., negotiation,
mediation), women are “disempowered” and do less well than
they might in more formal, rule and procedure based settings
such as full court adjudication . . . . But, researchers outside of
law have empirically demonstrated that in fact women are more
effective at speaking the language of problem solving which is
particularly used in such informal settings as mediation. . . .
[R]ecent research comments on this, noting that some women
plaintiffs are less comfortable talking and advocating strongly
in mediation settings, but that female lawyers are more likely to

124. Cf. id. at 1005-06 (footnotes omitted) (“The force of traditional stereotypes is
compounded by the subjectivity of performance evaluations and by other biases in
decision-making processes. People are more likely to notice and recall information
that confirms prior assumptions than information that contradicts them. . . . These
assumptions can then become self-fulfilling prophecies. Expectations affect evaluations, which then affect outcomes that reinforce initial expectations.”).
These gender biases appear to extend to neutral selections. In their empirical
analysis of survey results, Andrea Schneider and Gina Brown reported that overall
representation of women as neutrals is 31%; the percentages varied based on practice
area from the single digit lows of seven percent (7%) women in intellectual property to
a majority of women neutrals in small claims, at 64%. Gina Viola Brown & Andrea
Kupfer Schneider, Gender Differences in Dispute Resolution Practice: Report on the
ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Practice Snapshot Survey, 47 AKRON L. REV. 975,
987 (2015).
125. Bowles et al., supra note 110.
126. Amanatullah & Morris, supra note 109, at 264.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3037162

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HNR\22-1\HNR101.txt

Fall 2016]

unknown

Seq: 27

10-JUL-17

Mandatory ADR Notice Requirements

16:28

27

engage in problem solving and collaborative behavior in mediation settings, suggesting that the role that gender plays in dispute resolution is strongly tied to role (professional), as well as
to place or site of dispute resolution.127

However, gender differentials, real or perceived, do not appear in
some of the newer, nuanced studies. Recent workplace data, for example, reveal that women are negotiating, or “asking,” for promotions and raises at the same rates as their male colleagues.128
Scholar Andrea Schneider’s work in this area has reported that female lawyers were judged as effective in negotiations as their male
colleagues and, while rated more highly in assertiveness than their
male counterparts, did not seem to suffer a backlash effect.129
Clearly, the role of gender in negotiations as well as in dispute resolution settings is complex, and the data are nuanced and must be interpreted with great care.
One final thought on these gender themes: evaluating the results
of a mediated or negotiated agreement vis-à-vis gender neutrality is a
Nicomachean exercise that has the potential to perpetuate and “normalize” stereotypical and inherently paternalistic constructs of concepts of “fairness,” “good,” or “better.” While a central goal of ADR is
to produce fair mediation agreements130 and to obtain the “best” outcomes for negotiation parties, the characteristics of these aspirational
127. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Women in Dispute Resolution: Parties, Lawyers and
Dispute Resolvers-What Difference Does ‘Gender Difference’ Make?, 18 DISP. RESOL.
MAG. 4, 6 (2012).
128. Benjamin Artz, Amanda H. Goodall & Andrew J. Oswald, Do Women Ask?
(Discussion Paper No. 10183, The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 5-11, Sept.
2016). Statistical analyses of Australian employee and workplace data from the 20132014 Australian Workplace Relations Survey reveal that 75% of males reported asking for a raise, while 66% of women reported asking. Id. at 7. However, when the data
were controlled for the number of hours worked, there is no gender differential in
“asking” rates. Id. at 8-9. These data also tantalizingly hinted that there might be an
age effect in the results. Based upon a finding that, for workers under the age of 40,
women in the labor market appear statistically indistinguishable from the younger
men, the report concluded that “it could be that negotiating behavior has begun to
change.” Id. at 11. But see WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2016 12 (McKinsey & Company
2016) (“The bad news is that women who negotiate are disproportionately penalized
for it. They are . . . more likely than men . . . to receive feedback that they are “intimidating,” “too aggressive,” or “bossy” . . . [and] less likely to be promoted.”).
129. Andrea Kupfer Schneider et. al., Likeability v. Competence: The Impossible
Choice Faced by Female Politicians, Attenuated by Lawyers, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 363, 377-80 (2010).
130. See e.g., Joseph B. Stulberg, Must a Mediator Be Neutral? You Better Believe
It!, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 829, 830 (2012); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation
and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 47, 49 (1996).
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results, and how best to consistently achieve them, are topics of considerable debate among ADR scholars and practitioners.131 Not only
is there the methodological question of what baseline measure for
process is appropriate,132 but notions of “fairness” also are inherently
subjective and have ideological, philosophical, and political overtones. Any attempt by non-participants to characterize the outcome
of an individual mediation or negotiation as an “unfair,” “worse,” or
“bad” result for individual women, even if well-intentioned, might,
paradoxically, reinforce pervasive gendered stereotypes about women
and ADR.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS - GENDER THEMES AND
INTENTIONALITY VIS-À-VIS MANDATORY NOTICE OF ADR OPTIONS
There are strong critiques of ADR options as institutional perpetuations of oppression, and many warn that these informal alternatives may create process dangers for women.133 Further, although it
is not at all clear that women fare worse in ADR by objective measures, a belief persists that the performance and results of women are
“worse” in these fora than those of men.134
If ADR may pose risks for women, one must ask why these gender themes appear to be absent from the prolonged, vigorous debate
regarding the propriety of imposing a duty on lawyers to advise clients about ADR. This is deeply troubling, particularly when one considers the sheer volume of explicit mandates, explicit exhortations,
and implicit reminders on this subject that already exist within the
131. See Michael T. Colatrella Jr., Informed Consent in Mediation: Promoting Pro
Se Parties’ Informed Settlement Choice While Honoring The Mediator’s Ethical Duties,
15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT. RESOL. 705, 714-15 (2014). Under one interpretation of the
Model Standards, an agreement should be deemed fair “if the party made a settlement decision uncoerced [and] assisted by an impartial mediator who empowered the
participant as fully as their resources allowed.” See id. at 715. Under this formulation,
the fact that an agreement is the result of unequal bargaining power is not enough for
the agreement to be deemed unfair. See id. at 716 (citing Jennifer M. Ralph, Unconscionable Mediation Clauses: Garrett v. Hooters-Toledo, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 383,
396 (2005)). In order to fail the procedural fairness requirement, an agreement must
be so one-sided that it would be considered unconscionable under the law of the relevant jurisdiction. Colatrella, supra note 131, at 713.
132. CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, Dispute Resolution, supra note 88, at 597. Not to
mention that this ignores “an unstated assumption that if law is the baseline for ‘justice’ in settlements, then majoritarian enacted laws (by legislatures) are just for all.”
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2676 (1995).
133. See infra Section III.
134. RELIS, supra note 90.
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ethical codes and norms, court rules, statutes, and professional
creeds of individual jurisdictions.135
These existing norms make it all the more compelling to continue
to raise questions and concerns and to educate the bar and the public
about the potential impact of ADR on women. These gender themes
do, I believe, raise a number of significant questions.
A first question is primarily rhetorical: has ADR failed to fulfill
its promise?136 This question has several layers, one of which relates
to several somewhat diametrical critiques of the contemporary ADR
project as either: (1) an increasingly institutionalized and formalistic
isomorph that categorizes dispute processes and defines the attributes of each type or style,137 or (2) an informal, private form of social
control, the critique with which the gender theme is aligned.138
The second layer of the question is the more pragmatic: if not
mediation or some form of ADR, then what? Or, as one colleague put
more bluntly, “Just when you ADR people have caused trials to virtually vanish,139 are you now telling us that your alternatives are
flawed?” While this is a provocative question, no one seriously suggests that every alternative process is appropriate for every dispute.140 To quote a common aphorism amongst statisticians,
135. See, e.g., infra Section II.
136. This is not an oblique reference to a seminal work in our field, ROBERT A.
BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994). The question is in no way
related to the transformative model of mediation described therein.
137. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale
of Innovation Co-opted of “The Law of ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991); Austin
Sarat, The “New Formalism” in Disputing and Dispute Processing, 21 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 695, 695-701 (1988).
138. See, e.g., Amy J. Cohen, Debating the Globalization of U.S. Mediation: Politics, Power, and Practice in Nepal, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 295, 305-06 (2006).
139. This is, of course, a somewhat tongue-in-cheek reference to Marc Galanter’s
report, funded by the ABA. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of
Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL STUD. 459
(2004), available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/courses.judpol.Galanter.pdf. For
the resulting conference publication, see volume 1 of the Journal of Empirical Studies.
Id. The report generated an extraordinarily prodigious and polarized debate regarding the causes, consequences, and significance of the collected data that indicated a
general reduction in the rate and, in some instances, the number of trials. As one
scholar stated the “phenomenon known as the vanishing trial . . . has taken on a life of
its own that transcends empirical reality.” John Lande, Shifting the Focus from the
Myth of “The Vanishing Trial” to Complex Conflict Management Systems, or I Learned
Almost Everything I Need to Know About Conflict Resolution from Marc Galanter, 6
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 191, 191 (2005).
140. See, e.g., Robert Rubinson, Mapping the World: Facts and Meaning in Adjudication and Mediation, 63 ME. L. REV. 61 (2010).
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“Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.”141 ADR can
be “wrong” when parties and counsel do not participate in good faith;
ADR processes have been used for strategic, and sometimes blatantly
nefarious, purposes.142 Like the courts, informal alternatives also can
be “wrong” when they are engaged in ways that genericize “women;”
IPV victims; racial, ethnic, or religious minorities; the poor, or the
disabled into undifferentiated, unidimensional singularities, all susceptible to the same vulnerabilities as others who might be particularly exposed to exploitation in ADR. Context does matter.
Finally, more practice-oriented questions arise regarding responses to gender differentials. What form do responses to the issue
take, and where and how might they be implemented most effectively? These questions require reflection and serious inquiry: others
have begun this work. For example, the Uniform Collaborative Law
Act requires that clients provide informed consent to participate in
an alternative dispute resolution process and that lawyers assure the
safety of clients who do consent to participate.143
This article does not propose definitive answers. Rather, it poses
the questions and urges neutrals and lawyers advising clients about
ADR options to become educated about and alert to gender or similar
differentials in these processes, perceived or real, and how they may
be impacting their work or clients. Continuing to ignore, or remain
ignorant of, possible process dangers or to reflexively institute special
rules or enhanced duties of care for “at risk” clients may reinforce
entrenched gender schemata. This concern is not abstract. One male
commentator reported this on the process dangers for women in divorce mediation:
Although none of the answers that have been given . . . are particularly flattering to women, three stand out as being most
prevalent. The first is based on the assumption that men tend to
think more logically and analytically than women. Women, it is
claimed, tend to think more in terms of relationships. This, so
141. GEORGE E.P. BOX & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-BUILDING AND RESURFACES 414 (2007).
142. See generally Peter N. Thompson, Good Faith Mediation in the Federal
Courts, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 363, 377-78, 391 (2011) (examining a number
of attempts to define a “good faith” standard in the context of mediation, several of
which would include conduct such as using the process to impose hardship on one’s
counterpart, to gain a strategic advantage, to intimidate, or to convey
misrepresentations).
143. Unif. Collaborative Law Act §§ 14, 15 (2009), in 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 421, 45763, 484 (2010). See also Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in
Family Law: Looking at Interjurisdictional Recognition, 43 FAM. L.Q. 923, 932 (2010).
SPONSE

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3037162

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HNR\22-1\HNR101.txt

Fall 2016]

unknown

Seq: 31

10-JUL-17

Mandatory ADR Notice Requirements

16:28

31

the argument goes, leaves them at a disadvantage in their dealings with men because they will be more inclined to ignore principles of right and fairness to maintain relationships within the
family. The second is that, not being experienced in either the
world of finance or the art of negotiation, they will be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their husbands, who are experts in both. The
third, which is the one most commonly voiced, is that because of
their historical social position, men are more powerful than
women.144

These characterizations of the root causes of this situation are
not only insensitive, they also are not particularly precise. Rather
than allow such comments to depict women in these circumstances as
vulnerable, victimized, or disadvantaged,145 it would be preferable to
deconstruct inaccurate gender labels and craft solutions that respond
more broadly for the advantage of a larger set of beneficiaries. Nearly
all clients would benefit from counseling about the advantages and
disadvantages of the various DR processes, including litigation. Lawyers should counsel each client individually and contextually to identify, evaluate, and select the options that satisfy the client’s interests
in a given situation.146
Lawyers and policymakers should bring intentionality to their
deliberations, both public and private, regarding the potential for
gender bias arising from the fulfillment of a mandatory ADR notice.
These deliberations should not become an opportunity to exploit caricatures of gendered powerlessness147 or to perpetuate stereotypes
about the lack of competency of women. Rather, the focus should be
on improving the quality of lawyering and legal services and the
144. Lenard Marlow, Samson and Delilah in Divorce Mediation, 38 FAM. & CONCOURTS REV. 224, 224 (2000).
145. Cf. Lori Beaman-Hall, Abused Women and Legal Discourse: The Exclusionary
Power of Legal Method, 11 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 125, 136-37 (1996) (“Women who do not
have the economic resources to hire their own lawyers must rely on the provincial
legal aid system to provide legal assistance[ ] . . .[and] must premise their application
on their status as a victim because only victims of abuse are eligible for services.
Thus, even if an abused woman wishes to characterize herself as a survivor, the legal
aid system insists that she identify herself as a victim. Lucinda Finley notes that
legal language has the power’to construct and contain individual and cultural understandings of situations and social relationships,’ thus inhibiting change. The legal aid
system therefore functions to preserve the status quo. In this way, the control of
abused women is perpetuated by both their abusive husbands and legal discourse.”).
146. And, regardless whether those goals are legal or non-legal. See Leigh Goodmark, Clinical Cognitive Dissonance: The Values and Goals of Domestic Violence Clinics, the Legal System, and the Students Caught in the Middle, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 301,
305-06 (2012).
147. CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 38-39 (1987).
CILIATION
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skills of ADR practitioners, a priority being to increase attorney familiarity with, training in, and direct experience with dispute resolution processes as counsel or third-party neutrals.148 Critical too is an
intentional acknowledgement that a wide range of “voices,”149 intelligences, and capacities exist within the practicing bar and amongst its
clients and that this multiplicity of competencies should be recognized, respected, and embraced.

148. While it is not likely that other states would follow suit, Georgia requires
that, in “order to educate the bar about the benefits of ADR and the specifics of ADR
processes, each member of the State Bar of Georgia shall be required to complete a
one-time mandatory three hour CLE credit in dispute resolution.” Ga. Sup. Ct., Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules VIII (May, 28, 2014), http://godr.org/sites/default/
files/Godr/supreme_court_adr_rules/CURRENT%20ADR%20RULES%20COMPLETE
%205-28-2014.pdf. Law school ADR courses, courses in which neutrals are trained,
and approved CLE seminars devoted to ADR are deemed to satisfy the requirement.
Id.
149. See infra Section III.
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